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From the outset, turnover taxes have played a fundamental role in the European 
integration process. Harmonisation of these taxes was perceived an integral part of 
achieving a common market, and for this reason it was given priority.  Over forty years 
since the introduction of a common VAT system, VAT is usually regarded as a broadly 
harmonised tax.  Paradoxically, however, it is precisely this high level of harmonisation 
which seems to have allowed the preservation of some aspects of VAT law which 
constitute an obstacle to the establishment of the EC internal market. The aim of this 
paper is to highlight the shortcomings of harmonisation within the VAT area, and namely 
how harmonisation has prevented the European Court of Justice (ECJ) from applying the 
EC Treaty provisions to the field of VAT, resulting in the maintenance of laws which 
could arguably be regarded as contrary to the EC internal market and as restrictions to 
the fundamental freedoms. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
From the very outset, turnover taxes have played a fundamental role in the European 
integration process. Harmonisation of these taxes was perceived an integral part of achieving 
a common market, both in the context of a sector-based common market – as in the case of 
the European Coal and Steel Community – and in the context of a generic common market – 
as was the case with the European Economic Community.  For this reason their harmonisation 
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was given priority: in 1967 a common VAT system was established,1 and in 1977 a common 
VAT base was approved.2 Over forty years – and many amending legislation – later, VAT is 
usually regarded as a broadly harmonised tax. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely this high 
level of harmonisation which seems to have allowed the preservation of some aspects of VAT 
law which may constitute an obstacle to the establishment of the EC internal market. 
The aim of this paper is to highlight the shortcomings of harmonisation within the VAT area, 
and namely how harmonisation has prevented the European Court of Justice (ECJ) from 
applying the EC Treaty provisions to the field of VAT, resulting in the maintenance of laws 
which could arguably be regarded as contrary to the EC internal market and deemed as 
restrictions to the fundamental freedoms. Part two of the paper highlights how VAT has been 
very much at the centre of European integration from the outset and its harmonisation 
regarded as fundamental for the establishment of a common / internal market.  In part three 
the hierarchy of EC norms, as well as the role of the ECJ in areas which have been subject to 
more or less extensive harmonisation, are analysed. The (in)compatibility of the current VAT 
law with the EC internal market will be considered in part four, with reference to the concept 
of internal market under the EC Treaty. Historical, practical and jurisprudential arguments 
will be presented, and a comparison between the ECJ approach to VAT and its approach to 
direct taxation will be undertaken.  Part five concludes with considerations on the role of the 
ECJ as a constitutional court. 
 
2. VAT: A Tax at the Centre of Internal Market Policy 
The Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community represented the first 
significant step towards harmonisation of turnover taxes, providing the institutional 
framework in which to initiate discussions on the introduction of a common turnover tax 
system. Although there was no specific reference to turnover taxes in the Treaty as a potential 
obstacle to the establishment of a coal and steel common market,3 there was an awareness of 
the potential negative impact that the application of different turnover taxes across Member 
States could have. It was this awareness that led the High Authority of the European Coal and 
Steel Community to set up in 1953 the Tinbergen Committee, a Committee of Experts 
                                                 
1 First Council Directive 67/227/EEC of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member 
States concerning turnover taxes, OJ 71, 14/04/1967, 1301; and Second Council Directive 67/228/EEC 
of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes – 
Structure and procedures for application of the common system of value added tax, OJ P71, 
14/04/1967, 1303. Hereafter “First VAT Directive” and “Second VAT Directive”, respectively. 
2 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 12 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: Uniform basis of assessment, 
OJ L145, 13/06/1977, 1. 
3 Article 4 ECSC Treaty lists several duties, measures, and subsidies which would be incompatible with 
the common market for coal and steel. However, there is no reference to turnover taxes. 
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entrusted with investigating the impact on the common market of the various turnover tax 
systems.4 The report presented by the Committee later the same year, known as the Tinbergen 
Report,5 concluded that the Community should adopt a new common turnover tax system 
applicable to the common market of coal and steel.  This common turnover tax would be 
based on the principle of taxation in the country of destination, and exemptions or refunds 
would be limited to the amount of the tax on the final transaction.  Although the 
recommendations of the Committee were never applied within the context of the European 
Coal and Steel Community, the report constituted a significant historical breakthrough in 
terms of the harmonisation of turnover taxes. For the first time in the history of European 
integration, the idea that different turnover taxes might constitute an obstacle to the proper 
functioning of the common market was expressed in an official document. Equally for the 
first time the suggestion was put forward that some kind of harmonisation – though the word 
was never used – should be pursued in the area of turnover taxes, in order to make the 
common market function effectively. 
Soon after the publication of the Tinbergen Report, the Spaak Report, calling for the creation 
of a general common market was released. The Report contained a chapter devoted to the 
problems of “Distortion and Harmonisation of Legislation”, raising the issue of potential 
distortions to the common market which could result from different legislation and the need, 
in some cases, to harmonise the Member State legislations.6  This chapter seems to have been 
a direct result of the position adopted by France during the intergovernmental negotiations, 
which consistently pointed out that if it was to join the common market, some kind of 
variation of “harmonization of fiscal and social charges” had to be inserted.7  The 
considerations set out in this chapter, together with the stated aim of achieving a free 
movement of commodities are fundamental to the comprehension of what would later become 
the Treaty of Rome’s turnover tax provisions.  Under the heading “Fiscal Provisions”, the 
EEC Treaty included several tax provisions, namely Articles 95 to 99.8 It has been said that 
“the chapter on Fiscal Provisions is formulated in the most limiting kind of language” and that 
“as regards taxation policy, the Treaty contains only the most timid of starting-points”.9 It 
should be noted, however, that if Article 99 represented only a starting point in terms of 
                                                 
4 Order No. 1-53 of 5 March 1953, Official Gazette of the Community of 7th March 1953. 
5 Report on the problems raised by the different turnover tax systems applied within the Common 
Market, Report prepared by the Committee of Experts set up under Order No. 1–53 of the High 
Authority, dated March 5, 1953, Luxembourg, 8 April 1953. 
6 See A. Schrauwen, Chapter xx above. 
7 See R. Bertrand, “The European Common Market Proposal” (1956) International Organization X, 
559–574, at 564-566. 
8 In their original numbering; these provisions currently correspond to Articles 90 to 93, and are 
included under the heading “Tax Provisions”. 
9 See W. Hallstein, former president of the European Commission, in Europe in the Making (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1972), at 156-157. 
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turnover taxes, it was undoubtedly an important one.10 It is clear from the wording of this 
provision that, following the Tinbergen Report, the authors of the EEC Treaty considered that 
the existence of different turnover tax systems would be incompatible with the objectives of 
the newly established Community.11 The function of Article 99 was therefore to remove those 
incompatibilities, thereby initiating the process of harmonisation of turnover taxes. 
Acting on the mandate provided by Article 99 of the EEC Treaty, the Commission set up 
several consecutive working groups in order to determine whether harmonisation of turnover 
taxes was indeed necessary “in the interest of the common market”, and if so, what were the 
available methods for achieving such harmonisation.12 The first of these working groups was 
the so-called “Working Group No. I”, which in their report dated late 1959 concluded that 
“the maintenance of the diversity of tax systems currently applied in the different Member 
States is prejudicial in character to the good working of the common market and it is desirable 
[…] to go on toward a harmonisation of the differing legislation relating to turnover taxes”.13 
In response to the report, the Commission decided to set up three further working groups and 
a committee: the working groups known as Sub-Groups A, B, and C were established in order 
to examine different aspects of the problem and various alternative solutions;14 whilst the 
Fiscal and Financial Committee, chaired by Professor Fritz Neumark, was in charge of 
studying the extent to which the disparities of public finance within Member States prejudiced 
the establishment of a common market which “guarantees conditions analogous to those of an 
internal market”.15 Despite the apparent broadness of the Fiscal and Financial Committee’s 
mandate, it was acknowledged from the outset that questions regarding indirect taxation, and 
particularly turnover taxes, would constitute one of the principal problems requiring the 
Committee’s attention. 
                                                 
10 See J. Reugebrink, “The Sixth Directive for the Harmonisation of Value Added Tax”, (1978) 
Common Market Law Review 15, 309-319, at 309. 
11 The differences between turnover taxes applied by Member States at the time were quite extensive. 
For a summary see K.V. Antal, “Harmonisation of Turnover Taxes in the Common Market” (1963) 
Common Market Law Review 1, 41–57, at 42–50. 
12 For a review of the historical evolution of the VAT harmonisation process see also C. Celorico 
Palma, “A hamonização comunitária do Imposto sobre o Valor Acrescentado – Quo Vadis?” in C. 
Celorico Palma (ed.), Estudos de Imposto sobre o Valor Acrescentado (Coimbra: Almedina, 2006), 9-
54. 
13 The EEC Reports on Tax Harmonisation – The Report of the Fiscal and Financial Committee and 
the Report of the Sub-Groups A, B and C (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, 1963), at 13. 
14 Sub-Group A was to study the potential removal of physical inspection at frontiers; Sub-Group B 
was to focus on the potential adoption of a single-phase general tax applied at the stage prior to retail 
trade, combined eventually with a tax on retailers; and Sub-Group C was to analyse the potential 
application of a common tax at the production stage, together with an entirely autonomous tax applied 
at the trading stage, or alternatively a common tax on added value, should occasion arise, combined 
with a tax levied at the trading stage. The Sub-Groups were to examine the extent to which each of 
these possibilities would allow the removal of the disadvantages put forward by the Report of the 
Working Group No. I. 
15 Mandate entrusted to a scientific committee for the study of fiscal and financial problems in the EEC, 
Appendix A of the Report of the Fiscal and Financial Committee. 
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Both the Sub-Groups and the Fiscal and Financial Committee released their reports in 1962. 
Of these, the report of the Fiscal and Financial Committee known as the Neumark Report 
would undoubtedly turn out to be the most influential, predictably dealing in great detail with 
the issue of harmonization of turnover taxes. The overall conclusion was that those Member 
States which levied cumulative turnover taxes should replace them with a general system of 
value added tax, a conclusion that has been characterized as “audacious”, in light of the fact 
that at the time all Member States, with the exception of France, applied cumulative taxes.16 
The report presented several reasons in support of this conclusion, in particular the fact that 
despite being the simplest type of turnover taxes the deficiencies of cumulative taxes were 
well documented, most notably the creating of the so-called cascading effect – i.e. tax upon 
tax which occurs as taxed products are passed from manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer.17 
Moreover, the fact that taxation of services would be a much easier task under a VAT system 
was also perceived as a great advantage.18 
In light of the recommendations of the Neumark Report, the European Commission submitted 
in late 1962 a proposal for a Directive which envisaged the adoption by Member States of a 
common system of VAT.19 Following difficult and lengthy negotiations, the Council finally 
adopted in 1967 the First VAT Directive and the Second VAT Directive.  Ten years later it 
was the turn of the Sixth VAT Directive being approved amidst high expectations.20 Progress 
in achieving further harmonisation remained slow in the years following the entry into force 
                                                 
16 See B. Terra and P. Wattel, European Tax Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, Fourth 
Edition, 2005), at 200–201. France is usually credited as being the first country in the world to 
introduce a value added tax system, see L. Ebrill et al, The Modern VAT (Washington D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 2001), at 4; although others point to the US state of Michigan, see R. 
Krever and D. White (Eds.), GST in Retrospect and Prospect (Wellington: Thomson Brookers, 2007), 
at vii. 
17 In fact, it was reportedly trying to mitigate the disadvantages of the cascade element that a VAT, in 
its invoice-credit form, developed initially in France, see L. Ebrill et al, n. 16 above, at 6. On the 
introduction of a VAT system in France see also C.S. Shoup, “Taxation in France” (1955) National Tax 
Journal 8, 325-344. 
18 The overall comparative advantages of introducing a VAT system, as well as other historical 
practical reasons, have made VAT one of the most popular taxes in the world, see L. Ebrill, n. 16 
above, at 4-13; M. Keen and B. Lockwood, “The Value-Added Tax: its Causes and Consequences” 
(2007) IMF Working Paper WP/07/183; and R.M. Bird and P.P. Gendron, The VAT in Developing and 
Transitional Countries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 16 et seq. This outstanding 
growth and spread of the tax has led authors to comment that “the nearly universal introduction of VAT 
should be considered the most important event in the evolution of tax structure in the last half of the 
20th century”, and that “the rise of VAT is an unparalleled tax phenomenon”, see S. Cnossen, Global 
trends and issues in value added taxation, OCfEB Research Memorandum 9802, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 1998, at 4; and A.A. Tait, Value Added Tax – International Practice and 
Problems (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1988), at 3, respectively. 
19 See Doc. IV/COM(62) 217. 
20 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 12 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to turnover taxes, OJ L145, 13/06/1977, 1. Hereafter “Sixth VAT Directive”. 
Some commentators going as far as to consider the Sixth Directive as an “European VAT Code”, see P. 
Miconi, “Razões Justificativas da Introdução de um Sistema de Imposto sobre o Valor Acrescentado” 
(1979) Ciência e Técnica Fiscal 244/246, April/June, at 429; and A. E. Genot, “Fiscal Harmonisation 
and European Integration: A 1978 Appraisal” (1978) European Law Review 3, 355–369, at 360. 
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of the Sixth Directive,21 and it was not until the publication of the White Paper and the 
introduction of the internal market policy that real development was attained. 
In June 1985, the Commission presented the White Paper for the completion of the internal 
market. The paper laid down a series of measures with a view to establishing an internal 
market by 1992, divided under three headings: removal of physical barriers; removal of 
technical barriers; and removal of fiscal barriers. Under the heading “removal of fiscal 
barriers”, the paper contained several measures in the field of VAT. The role of this tax 
within the overall aim of achieving an internal market was clearly acknowledged by the 
Commission: 
“It is clear […] that the harmonisation of indirect taxation has always been regarded as an 
essential and integral part of achieving a true common market. Momentum has been lost 
in recent years but this was due essentially to the impact of the recession on the economic 
policies of Member States and preoccupation with other problems. But progress is being 
resumed and now we must proceed vigorously if we are to achieve the target date of 1992 
for the completion of the Internal Market.”22 
As regards what level of harmonisation of VAT was required in order to establish the internal 
market, the White Paper’s highlighted that “complete harmonisation, which has come to 
imply absolute identity in every respect, is not essential” – however, a close level of 
“approximation” was required. This approximation had to be “sufficiently close that the 
operation of the common market is not effected through distortions of trade, diversion of 
trade, and effects on competition”.23 In order to attain this level of “approximation”, progress 
had to be achieved in three areas of the system: tax base or coverage; tax rates; and 
arrangements applicable to cross-border transactions.24  In the summer of 1987, following the 
White Paper strategy, the Commission issued a Global Communication outlining its proposals 
                                                 
21 One important development during this period, however, was the approval of the Directives 
regarding the refund procedure for taxable persons not established in the territory of the country: 
Eighth Council Directive 79/1072/EEC of 6 December 1979, OJ L331, 27/12/1979, 11; and Thirteenth 
Council Directive 86/560/EEC of 17 November 1986, OJ L 326, 21/11/1986, 40. Hereafter “Eighth 
VAT Directive”. 
22 Completing the Internal Market – White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, 
COM(85) 310, 14 June 1985, at 42; hereafter “White Paper”. It is interesting to note that the White 
Paper is not the first European Commission’s document where the connection between establishing, or 
completing, the internal market and VAT harmonisation was established, albeit the only one containing 
detailed instructions on how to attain this objective. In fact, in the years prior to the release of the 
White Paper, the Commission had issued several documents highlighting the need for further 
harmonisation of VAT, and particularly the abolition of fiscal frontiers – amongst other measures – in 
order to establish a genuine internal market. See Strengthening the Internal Market, Communication 
from the Commission to the Council, COM(82) 399 final, 24 June 1982, at 2-5; and Consolidating the 
Internal Market, Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(84) 305 final, 13 June 
1984, at 9-34. 
23 White Paper, n. 22 above, at 46. 
24 Id at 52. 
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for indirect taxes with a view to the completion of the internal market.25 The proposals (and 
one working paper) presented during that same period became known as the 1987 proposals 
and envisaged major changes to the Community VAT system then in force. These were, 
however, widely regarded as very ambitious in both their aims and their prospected methods 
for achieving these aims.26 By late 1989 the Commission realised that the Council would fail 
to reach agreement. The focus thus shifted towards agreeing upon a VAT system which 
continued to be based on the principle of taxation in the country of destination, but which at 
the same time permitted the abolition of border controls. The idea of a transitional phase 
started to take shape. 
During the period between 1989 and 1991, a series of key meetings of the ECOFIN Council 
of Ministers took place, from which emerged the basic shape of the VAT arrangements to be 
applied to intra-Community trade after 1993. These were to become known as the 
“transitional VAT system”. In the summer of 1996 the European Commission presented a 
work programme with a view to adopting a definitive VAT system.27 Unfortunately, the 1996 
approach proved as difficult to implement as the 1987 one, and very little progress was made 
on the Commission’s proposed programme. By 2000, therefore, the Commission had decided 
to put forward a new VAT strategy based on a dual premise: on one hand, that the VAT 
transitional system contained a number of shortcomings which required urgent action; on the 
other hand, that it was unlikely that progress in establishing a definitive VAT system would 
be achieved. The introduction of a definitive system has, thus, been postponed indefinitely as 
a long term goal. In the short term, the Commission’s intends to pursue its new “viable 
strategy” to overcome the shortcomings of the transitional VAT system.28 As the new 
Commission’s strategy unfolds and begins to bear fruit it is clear that over fifty years since 
the Tinbergen Report, VAT continues to be very much at the centre of the EC internal market 
policy. 
 
                                                 
25 Completion of the internal market: approximation of indirect tax structures and harmonisation of 
indirect tax structure. Global Communication from the Commission, COM(87) 320 final, 5 August 
1987. 
26 A.J. Easson expressed a widely felt skepticism when he commented: “to expect to achieve an 
alignment of tax rates by 1992, by the end of the century or even by the middle of the next one, is to be 
completely unrealistic. The approach which has been exposed by the Commission for the past 25 years 
or so is doomed to fail”, in “The Elimination of Fiscal Frontiers”, in R. Bieber et al (eds.), 1992: One 
European Market? A Critical Analysis of the Commission’s Internal Market Strategy (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988), 241–260, at 260. 
27 See A common system of VAT – A programme for the Single Market, COM(96) 328 final, 22 July 
1996. 
28 See A strategy to improve the operation of the VAT system within the context of the Internal Market, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2000) 348 
final, 7 June 2000; and Review and update of VAT strategy priorities, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social 
Committee, COM(2003) 614 final, 10 October 2003. 
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3. Hierarchy of EC Norms and the Role of the ECJ Post Harmonisation 
3.1 Hierarchy of EC norms 
Established initially by the ECJ in Costa,29 the principle of supremacy – the Community’s 
constitutional principle according to which Community law takes precedent over conflicting 
national law – has long been firmly recognised by Member States.30 Yet, within the EC legal 
order norms establishing hierarchies of norms is considerably less clear.  For many years the 
concept of “hierarchy” within EC norms was somewhat neglected, probably as a result of the 
lack of basic written principles on the settlement of conflicts of norms.31 This despite the fact 
that hierarchy of norms in the European legal order has been enshrined in the Treaty from the 
outset,32 and that the Court has been referring to the hierarchy of norms as an unwritten 
principle of European law for several decades.33  
One hierarchy, however, is generally accepted to exist: that between norms of fundamental 
character, such as those set out in the Treaties, and implementing norms,34 i.e. between 
primary EC law and secondary EC law.35 Whilst the reference to the EC Treaty as the 
“constitutional charter of the Community” can be traced back to Les Verts,36 its primacy 
within the hierarchy of EC norms has been recently re-emphasised by the ECJ in Kadi: 
“[…] the Community is based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States 
not its institutions can avoid review of the conformity of their acts with the basic 
constitutional charter, the EC Treaty, which established a complete system of legal 
                                                 
29 Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 1141. 
30 Despite years of controversy – for a comprehensive review of Member States’ progressive 
recognition of the principle of supremacy, see P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law – Text, Cases and 
Materials, Third Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 353-377. Paradoxically Member 
States remain in their capacity as EC legislator in a superior position in respect of the exercise of this 
supremacy, see F.E. Dowrick, “A Model of the European Communities’ Legal System” (1983) 
Yearbook of European Law 3, 169-237, at 225-237. 
31 See R. Bieber and I. Salome, “Hierarchy of Norms in European Law” (1996) Common Market Law 
Review 33(5), 909-932, at 911-912. 
32 See amongst others Articles 220 and 234 of the EC Treaty as regards the competence of the ECJ and 
the preliminary ruling procedure, respectively. 
33 See cases 38/70, Tradax/Einfuhr-u. Vorratsstelle, [1971] ECR 145; 34/78, Yoshida / Kramer van 
Koophandel, [1979] ECR 115; 145/79, Roquette, [1980] ECR 2917. 
34 Id at 920. The concept of hierarchy has been rejected by M. Poiares Maduro and substituted by that 
of “contrapuntual law”, although the author does recognise that “[the Treaty] is to a certain extent the 
higher law of the Union and the criteria of validity of secondary rules and decisions as well as of all 
national legal rules and decisions within the scope of application of EU law”, see “Interpreting 
European Law – Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism” (2008) Working Paper 
IE Law School WPLS08-02, at 11; see also M. Poiares Maduro, “Contrapuntual Law: Europe’s 
Constitutional Pluralism in Action” in N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2003), 501-537. See also cases 25/70, Koster, [1970] ECR 1161; C-240/90, Germany v 
Commission, [1992] ECR I-5383; C-156/93, Parliament v Commission, [1995] ECR I-2019; and C-
417/93, Parliament v Council, [1995] ECR I-1185. 
35 For a definition of primary EC law and its relationship with secondary law, see T-113/96, Dubois, 
[1998] ECR II-140, at paragraph 41. 
36 Case 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament, [1986] ECR 1339. 
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remedies and procedures designed to enable the Court of Justice to review the legality 
of acts of the institutions.”37 
3.2 Hierarchy of EC norms applied to VAT 
In light of the above, one might assume that as Community secondary law VAT legislation 
had been subject to some level scrutiny of the ECJ in light of the Treaty provisions - its 
compatibility with the Treaty provisions assessed, or at the very least its interpretation done in 
light of those provisions undertaken, similarly to what has taken place as regards direct 
taxation. However, this cannot be further from the truth. There were a few rulings until the 
early 1990s – and the abolition of fiscal frontiers – which assessed the compatibility of 
national VAT legislation with Article 90 (ex Article 95) of the EC Treaty in respect of 
imports from other Member States.38 Overall, however, in over thirty years of VAT 
jurisprudence the ECJ has only assessed compatibility of EC secondary VAT legislation with 
the Treaty on very few occasions. 
Gaston Schul concerned the compatibility of Sixth VAT Directive provisions with what is 
now Article 90 of the EC Treaty.39 Gaston Schul, a company established in the Netherlands, 
imported a second-hand pleasure and sports boat on the instructions and on behalf of a private 
person. The Netherlands revenue authority levied VAT on importation at the rate of 18% – 
which was the normal rate applied within the country on the sale of similar goods – under the 
national provision which transposed Article 2 of the Sixth VAT Directive. Gaston Schul 
brought an action before the Dutch courts, claiming that the VAT charged was contrary to 
what are now Articles 28 and 29 of the EC Treaty on free movement of goods, and Article 90 
of the EC Treaty on indirect taxes.  It argued in essence that charging VAT on this import was 
incompatible with the Treaty, insofar as similar supplies within the territory of a Member 
State by a private person were not subject to VAT. It contented further that levying VAT on 
importation of products from another Member State supplied by a private person gave rise to 
an overlapping of taxes since, unlike supplies made by taxable persons, there was no 
remission in respect of VAT levied in the export Member State. Consequently, VAT levied 
on the importation of such products should be considered as a charge having an effect 
equivalent to a customs duty or as discriminatory internal taxation, for the purposes of 
Articles 28 and 90 of the EC Treaty, respectively. 
                                                 
37 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05P, [2008] ECR I-6351, at paragraph 281. 
38 See cases 39/82, Donner, [1983] ECR 19; 42/83, Denkavit, [1984] ECR 2649; 278/83, Commission v 
Italy, [1985] ECR 2503; 39/85, Bergeres-Becque, [1986] ECR 259; 200/85, Commission v Italy, [1986] 
ECR 3953; 104/86, Commission v Italy, [1988] ECR 1799; 299/86, Drexl, [1988] ECR 1213; C-
120/88, Commission v Italy, [1991] ECR 621; C-119/89, Commission v Spain, [1991] ECR I-641; C-
159/89, Commission v Greece, [1991] ECR I-691; and C-276/91, Commission v France, [1993] ECR I-
4413. 
39 Case 15/81, [1982] ECR 1409.  See also, Gaston Schul II, case 47/84, [1985] ECR 1491. 
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The Court started by dismissing the claim as regards the provisions regarding free movement 
of goods, stating: 
“[Harmonising directives] have established a uniform taxation procedure covering 
systematically and according to objective criteria both transactions carried out within the 
territory of the Member States and import transactions. […] As a result the tax in question 
must be considered as an integral part of a general system of internal taxation for the 
purposes of article 95 of the Treaty and its compatibility with Community law must be 
considered in the context of that article and not of that of Articles 12 et seq. of the 
Treaty.”40 
As regards the application of Article 90, Member States, as well as the Council and the 
Commission, took the view that the elimination of overlapping of taxes within the 
Community, however desirable, could only be achieved “by means of the gradual 
harmonisation of the national taxation systems under article 99 or 100 of the treaty and not by 
applying article 95”.  Furthermore, they contended that “the establishment of a system 
ensuring the complete neutrality of internal taxation with regard to intra-Community trade 
could take place only by strict application of the principle of taxation in the Member State of 
destination and that would mean full remission of tax on all products at the time of 
exportation. It is for the political institutions of the Community to adopt such a solution since 
it involves a political choice”.41 The ECJ accepted the argument. 
Since its inception in 1992 the Intrastat system – a statistical system set up to monitor intra-
Community transactions after the abolition of fiscal frontiers – has been surrounded by 
controversy, most notably due to the difficulties and extra compliance costs which it creates 
for traders. In 1996 the Court was called to decide on what was for a long time the main 
Intrastat legislative instrument, Council Regulation No. 3330/91.42 Kieffer and Thill did not 
concern the interpretation of specific provisions of that Regulation, but rather the nature of the 
Intrastat system itself, and namely its compatibility with the free movement of goods 
provisions in the EC Treaty.43  The defendants in the main proceedings, Kieffer and Thill, 
were managers of a company operating in Luxembourg, which engaged in intra-community 
transactions. Having failed to submit Intrastat returns, Mr. Kieffer and Mr. Thill were charged 
by the Luxembourg authorities with infringing the obligation under Regulation No. 3330/91 
                                                 
40 Id at paragraph 21. 
41 Id at paragraphs 25 and 37, respectively. 
42 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3330/91 of 7 November 1991 on the statistics relating to trading of 
goods between Member States (OJ L316, 16/11/1991, 1), actually introduced the Intrastat system. This 
regulation has been now substituted by Regulation (EC) No. 638/2004 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 31 March 2004 on Community statistics relation to the trading of goods between 
Member States and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3330/91, OJ L102, 07/04/2004, 1. 
43 Case C-114/96, [1997] ECR I-3629. 
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to transmit information on imports and exports by their company. Both defendants 
acknowledged that the business conducted by the company they managed exceeded the 
simplification threshold, and that they should, therefore, have submitted Intrastat monthly 
returns. They argued, however, that to comply with this obligation they would have to either 
take on staff, or have the obligations carried out by third parties, incurring additional expense 
in either case. These additional expenses they claimed would have the effect of curbing, at 
least indirectly, their efforts to export in excess of the annual threshold and would encourage 
the sale of goods on the national market. 
The referring court in Luxembourg considered that the detailed declaration required by 
Regulation No. 3330/91 did indeed constitute an additional constraint to which traders doing 
business in the national market alone were not subject. Moreover, it stated that the 
requirement to make that declaration, and the consequent increase in the obligations to be 
complied with by the undertakings concerned, could have a deterrent effect on small and 
medium-sized undertakings in Luxembourg whose activities extend beyond the national 
territory. In those circumstances, it considered that it should be ascertained whether such an 
impediment was justified from the point of view of the objectives of the Regulation and 
whether those objectives could not be attained by means constituting less of a constraint. 
Therefore, it essentially asked the ECJ the following: whether the obligations imposed upon 
traders under Regulation No. 3330/91 should be regarded as measures having equivalent 
effect to quantitative restrictions within the meaning of (former) Articles 28 and 29 of the EC 
Treaty; and alternatively, whether these same obligations constituted a restraint upon traders 
that is unjustified and disproportionate having regard to the objective of general interest 
pursued, and thereby in breach of the principle of proportionality as defined in Article 5 of the 
EC Treaty. 
The ECJ acknowledged that “it is common ground that the detailed nature of the declarations 
required and the fact that it is obligatory to make a declaration in both the Member State of 
consignment and that of destination of the goods have restrictive effects with regard to the 
free movement of goods”.44 It therefore accepted that the Intrastat obligations constituted 
restrictions to the free movement of goods. However, the Court noted that such restrictions 
may be justified if they are essential in order to obtain reasonably complete and accurate 
information on movements of goods within the Community, and in this context, it considered 
that the obligations imposed by Regulation No. 3330/91 were not “measures having 
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions” for the purposes of Articles 28 and 29 of the EC 
Treaty. Nor were they disproportionate: 
                                                 
44 Id at paragraph 28. 
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“[W]hile the obligation to make declarations under the Regulation does specifically affect 
cross-frontier trade, and drawing up the declarations takes time and involves expense, 
particularly for small and medium-sized undertakings, it does not necessarily follow that 
those restrictive effects are disproportionate to the aim pursued.”45 
Société Générale des Grandes Sources d’Eaux Minérales Françaises concerned the 
interpretation of Article 3(a) of the Eighth VAT Directive and the requirement to submit 
original invoices therein.46 Société Générale, a French company, submitted an application to 
the German authorities in order to obtain refund of the German VAT incurred under the 
Eighth VAT Directive. As the original invoices had been lost in the post when sent to lawyers 
instructed to process the claim, Société Générale attached instead duplicates of the original 
invoices. The German authorities then refused to grant the refund based on the lack of 
required documentation, i.e. the original invoices – even though a taxable person established 
in Germany was allowed to deduct VAT on production of a duplicate or photocopy of the 
invoice, where the original invoice was lost for reasons beyond the taxpayer’s control. The 
ECJ was therefore asked, amongst other questions, whether where a taxpayer established in a 
Member State may prove his entitlement to a refund of VAT by submitting a duplicate or 
photocopy of the invoice if the original invoice was lost for reasons beyond his control, it 
follows from the principle non-discrimination that such a possibility should be extended to 
taxpayers not established in that Member State. The Court held that the principle of non-
discrimination did indeed required that such possibility be extended to non-nationals.47 
In Lease Plan the ECJ was asked whether it was contrary to Article 6 of the EC Treaty setting 
out the principle of non-discrimination, and Article 49 of the EC Treaty on free movement of 
services, for national rules to provide that taxable persons not established in a Member State, 
who apply for a refund of VAT in accordance with the Eighth VAT Directive, are entitled to 
interest only from such time as notice to pay was served on that Member State, and at a lower 
rate than that applied to the interest paid to taxable persons established in the territory of that 
State automatically on the expiry of the statutory time-limit for reimbursement.48 The Belgian 
government submitted that discrimination could only arise where different rules were applied 
to comparable situations, and this was not the case as regards the rules on the payment of 
interests. It argued that taxable persons established in the Member State concerned, who 
sought a refund of VAT paid on a transaction effected in a second Member State, could not be 
compared with that of taxpayers established in the second Member State and who either 
pursue a taxable economic activity on an irregular basis there or seek refund of the VAT on a 
                                                 
45 Id at paragraph 34. 
46 Case C-361/96, [1998] ECR I-3495. 
47 Id at paragraph 38. 
48 Case C-390/96, [1998] ECR I-2553. 
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transaction of a not exclusively business nature. The Court disagreed: it considered that 
national VAT rules to provide that taxable persons not established in a Member State, who 
apply for a refund of VAT in accordance with the Eighth Directive, are entitled to interest 
only from such time as notice to pay was served on that Member State and a lower rate than 
that applied to the interest paid to taxable persons established in the territory of that State 
automatically on the expiry of the statutory time-limit for reimbursement was indeed contrary 
to the EC Treaty provisions on free movement of services. 
Teleos and Others concerned the exemption applicable to intra-Community supplies of 
goods.49 Amongst other questions, the national court asked the ECJ whether the provisions in 
the VAT Directive should be interpreted as precluding the competent authorities of a Member 
State from requiring a supplier, who in good faith submitted evidence which established a 
right to exemption on an intra-Community supply of goods, to account for VAT when that 
evidence is found to be false. In this regard, Teleos and Others submitted that in cases where 
it is shown after the acquisition that the purchaser committed fraud and the goods never 
actually left the territory of the Member State, the imposition by the tax authorities of a 
Member State of the entire burden of proof, as well as the liability to account for VAT on the 
intra-Community supply of goods, adversely affected the proper functioning of the single 
market and interfered with the free movement of goods. The Court started by stating that 
preventing possible tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an objective recognized and 
encouraged the Directive, and thus in certain circumstances justify restrictions on the free 
movement of goods. In went on to state, however, that: 
“Whilst it is true that the regime governing intra-Community trader has become more 
open to fraud, the fact remains that the requirements for proof established by the Member 
States must comply with the fundamental freedoms established by the EC Treaty, such as, 
in particular, the free movement of goods.”50 
The ECJ ultimately concluded that the VAT Directive provisions should be interpreted as 
precluding tax authorities from denying a supplier of intra-Community transactions the right 
to exemption, where this supplier acted in good faith and no evidence of participation in fraud 
could be established. Although, throughout analysis of the freedoms was never undertaken, 
the Court seems to be indicating that the practice carried out by the tax authorities constituted 
a restriction to the free movement of goods, which could potentially be justified for 
combating tax evasion, but was ultimately deemed disproportional. Unfortunately, this step-
by-step detailed analysis was however not undertaken by the Court. 
                                                 
49 Case C-409/04, [2007] ECR I-7797. 
50 Id at paragraph 63. 
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Gaston Schul remains as an example of assessment of compatibility of the main VAT 
Directive with an EC Treaty provision; Kieffer and Thill and Teleos and Others as examples 
of application of the ECJ established approach to the fundamental freedoms to VAT 
legislation; Société Générale des Grandes Sources d’Eaux Minérales Françaises and Lease 
Plan as examples of national VAT norms transposing Directives’ provisions being regarded 
as incompatible with EC Treaty provisions.51 As of yet, the Court has never assessed the 
compatibility of the main VAT Directive’s provisions themselves with EC Treaty provisions 
concerning the concept of internal market and those regarding the fundamental freedoms. The 
obvious question which emerges is why? 
3.3 Role of the ECJ post harmonisation 
It is settled case law that free movement provisions apply not only to national measures but 
also to measures adopted by Community institutions.52 In principle, therefore, secondary 
Community law is subject to the judicial review of the ECJ in light of Treaty provisions, and 
there should be no reason why provisions in the VAT Directive should be exempt from such a 
review. This is, however, not the end of the story. Since the 1970s, the Court has also been 
holding – in a reasonably consistent manner – that in subject areas where harmonisation has 
taken place, application of EC Treaty provisions on free movement of goods and services is 
subject to limitations.53 These provisions will only apply where: harmonisation is not 
exhaustive, i.e. it is minimal;54 the harmonising legislation itself allows for application of the 
Treaty; or the harmonising legislation allows for Member States’ discretion on transposition 
or derogations.55  Moreover, the Court also seemed to rule in Bellamy that national measures 
correctly transposing Community secondary legislation cannot be regarded as constituting an 
obstacle to free movement.56 Does this constitute an inversion of hierarchies, or can it be 
reconciled with the above considerations on the hierarchy of EC norms? In a recent working 
                                                 
51 Another case concerning the application of the principle of non-discrimination in Article 6 of the EC 
Treaty is currently pending at the ECJ, see (…). 
52 See joined cases 80 and 81/77, Ramel, [1978] ECR 927; and cases 15/83, Denkavit Nederland, 
[1984] ECR 2171, at paragraph 15; C-15/93, Meyhui, [1994] ECR I-3879, at paragraph 11; and C-
114/96, Kieffer and Thill, [1997] ECR I-3629, at paragraph 27; and joined cases C-402/05 P and C-
415/05P, Kadi, [2008] ECR I-6351, at paragraph 281, cited above. 
53 Although it has been defended that the same basic principles should apply to other freedoms, namely 
free movement of persons, see P.J. Slot and M. Bulterman, “Harmonisation of Legislation on Migration 
EU Citizens and Third Country Nationals: Towards Uniform Evaluation Framework” (2005) Fordham 
International Law Journal 29, 747-789, at 787. 
54 See cases 5/77, Tedeschi, [1977] ECR 1577; C-99/01, Linhartand Biffl, [2002] ECR I-9375, at 
paragraphs 17-21; C-470/03, AGM-COS.MET, [2007] ECR I-2749, at paragraph 50; and C-265/06, 
Commission v Portugal, [2008] ECR I-2245, all on free movement of goods. See case C-6/98, ARD, 
[1999] ECR I-7599, on free movement of services. 
55 See cases C-322/01, DocMorris, [2003] ECR I-14887, at paragraph 64; and more recently C-205/07, 
Gysbrechts, Judgment of 16 December 2008. 
56 Case C-123/00, [2001] ECR I-2795, at paragraph 21. 
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document as regards the operation of the free movement of goods provisions, the European 
Commission offers an explanation: 
“[…] harmonising legislation can be understood as substantiating the free movement of 
goods principle by establishing actual rights and duties to be observed in the case of 
specific products. Therefore, any problem that is covered by harmonising legislation 
would have to be analysed in the light of such concrete terms and not according to the 
broad principles enshrined in the Treaty.”57 
Indeed whilst it is clear that secondary EC legislation is bound by the Treaty rules – and as set 
out above this hierarchy is now settled case law – how it should be reflected in practice is a 
matter of more debate. This is the case in particular as regards the relationship between 
secondary law and the free movement provisions. Two different positions have been 
defended: (i) the Community legislator is bound in the same way as Member States;58 (ii) the 
Community legislator is bound but not to the same extent as Member States. Most authors 
adopt the second view, i.e. that the Community is bound by Treaty rules, although enjoying a 
certain margin of discretion.59 This position does seem to be the one which seats better with 
the ECJ case law on the manner – whether as a matter of principle this should actually be the 
case is another issue altogether. 
What does this mean for VAT? Assuming that (a), the case law above on primacy of 
secondary law where exhaustive harmonisation has taken place is compatible with the 
principle of hierarchy of EC norms, on the basis that secondary Community law although 
bound by the Treaty is subject to higher level of discretion. Still, the Court has stated on 
different occasions, as has the European Commission, that VAT is not an area exhaustively 
harmonised.60 Moreover, many provisions of VAT law allow for Member States’ discretion 
on transposition or derogations. Both factors which would indicate that the case law on non-
application of Treaty provisions should not apply, and thus VAT law should still be 
interpreted in light of these provisions, and its compatibility with those assessed. What if they 
did apply? Assuming then that (b), as it currently stands VAT is regarded as an exhaustively 
harmonised area of law, and thus secondary VAT law should take primacy over EC Treaty 
                                                 
57 See Free Movement of Goods – Guide to the Application of Treaty Provisions Governing Free 
Movement of Goods (Articles 28-30 EC), Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2009) 673 final, 
12 May 2009, at 8-9. 
58 See E.U. Petersmann, “National Constitutions, Foreign Trade Policy and European Community 
Law” (1992) European Journal of International Law 3, 1-35, at 9 et seq. 
59 See K. Morterlmans, “The Relationship Between the Treaty Rules and Community Measures for the 
Establishment and Functioning of the Internal Market – Towards a Concordance Rule” (2002) 
Common Market Law Review 39(6), 1303-1346, at 1312-1316. 
60 In Denkavit the ECJ stated, “[…] the fact that the Sixth Directive provides for partial harmonisation 
of national tax laws does not exclude the application of Article 95 of the Treaty”, in case 42/83, [1984] 
ECR 2649, at paragraph 27; see also Gaston Schul, case 15/81, [1982] ECR 1409, at paragraph 13. Of 
course the level of harmonisation in 1984 was much lower, but the statements are still significant. 
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provisions in VAT cases. This still does not exclude the possibility of judicial review. 
Notwithstanding the above, the ECJ nevertheless retains the possibility of assessing the 
compatibility of secondary VAT law with the Treaty. These above considerations are all the 
more significant in light of the fact that arguably the current EU VAT legal system does not 
fulfil, nor has the potential to fulfil through jurisprudential developments strictly based on 
interpretation of secondary law, the conditions of an internal market. 
 
4. (In)compatibility of VAT Law with the EC Internal Market61 
Historical, practical, and jurisprudential arguments support the thesis that the current 
European VAT law does not meet the conditions of an internal market. Presentation of these 
arguments should, however, be preceded by analysis of the concept of internal market itself. 
4.1 The concept of EC internal market 
What is the EC internal market? The central provision in terms of the internal market policy is 
currently Article 14 of the EC Treaty.62 This provision contains three basic rules.63 The first 
of these could be characterised as a definitional rule: paragraph two sets out the legal 
definition of internal market. The second is a competence rule: paragraph one establishes that 
the Community has the competence to adopt measures in order to establish the internal 
market, i.e., the Community’s legislative competence in this area. Finally, paragraph three can 
be classified as a procedural rule, establishing the Council’s obligation to determine the 
guidelines and conditions to ensure a balanced progress in establishing an internal market. 
Although the third rule – the procedural rule – is of less significance,64 the two others are 
fundamental to comprehension of the internal market policy. 
Internal market is defined in paragraph two of Article 14 of the EC Treaty as “an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty”. This definition has remained 
                                                 
61 This section presents a summary of the arguments originally set out in R. de la Feria, The EU VAT 
System and the Internal Market (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009). 
62 The numbering of these has been altered on two occasions: prior to the entry into force of the TEU 
(OJ C191, 29/07/1992), it was Article 8a EEC Treaty, as amended by the SEA; post TEU it was Article 
7a(2) EC Treaty, until the passage of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which altered the provision’s 
numbering to the current Article 14(2) EC Treaty, OJ C340, 10/11/1997. 
63 Article 22a of the yet to be fully ratified Treaty of Lisbon includes similar rules, albeit some 
important differences, in particular as regards the reference to a time limit, OJ C306, 17/12/2007, 53. 
64 In fact, it emerged during negotiations for the European Constitution, that this rule had never been 
used. It was, therefore, suggested by the working party of experts nominated with a view to making 
technical adjustments to the EC Treaty, that the paragraph should be deleted, see European Convention, 
Part Two of the Constitution – Report by the working party of experts nominated by the Legal Services 
of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, CONV 618/03, 17 March 2003, at 15. 
The recommendation was not, however, taken up and the paragraph was kept in the TCE, and 
afterwards in the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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unchanged since its introduction in the EEC Treaty by the Single European Act (SEA), and 
that will continue to be the case under the new Treaty of Lisbon.65 Yet, despite this 
definitional coherence, and as the Commission itself has implicitly acknowledged, its 
interpretation is far from clear.66 The definition has dual components: first, “an area without 
internal frontiers”; and second, “in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and 
capital is ensured”.67 
The expression “an area without internal frontiers” has been the subject of intense 
controversy: severely criticised by some,68 and regarded as the “key part of the definition” by 
others.69 Its origins seem to be rooted in the Commission’s White Paper Programme, which 
revolved around the idea of “abolition of frontiers”, divided into physical, technical, or fiscal 
frontiers. The IGC discussions confirm this assumption to the extent that the expression was 
included in the SEA on the basis of Commission’s proposals.70 It has been suggested that the 
expression was put forward by the Commission in order to include within the scope of the 
internal market other aspects, which might not be covered by the Treaty provisions relating to 
free movement, in particular as regards free movement of persons.71 This would seem to 
indicate that the scope of “an area without internal frontiers” is broader than that of free 
                                                 
65 Several amendments were suggested during the discussions held by the European Convention for the 
European Constitution, most of which maintained the essence of the definition, but added other 
elements to it, such as reference to approximation of laws and free competition. See the suggestions put 
forward by an independent group of lawyers at Cambridge University, so-called “Cambridge Text”, 
released as European Convention, Contribution by Mr. P. Hain, member of the Convention – 
Constitutional Treaty of the European union, CONV 345/1/02, 16 October 2002; the suggestions of a 
Franco-German research working group, known as “Freiburg Draft”, released as European Convention, 
Contribution submitted by Mr. Erwin Teufel, member of the Convention: “Freiburg Draft of a 
European Constitutional Treaty”, CONV 495/03, 20 January 2003; and the contribution of Mr. Elmar 
Brok, member of the European Convention, released as European Convention, Contribution by Mr. 
Elmar Brok, member of the Convention: “The Constitution of the European Union”, CONV 325/2/02, 
7 March 2003. Ultimately, however, Article III-130(2) TCE only included a minor change to the 
current text: the substitution of expression “this Treaty” by “the Constitution”, OJ C310, 16/12/2004; 
and a similar approach was adopted by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
66 See A.A.M. Schrauwen, Marche Interieur – Recherches sur une notion, Doctorate Thesis, University 
of Amsterdam, 1997, at 138. Equally, G. de Búrca comments that “internal market” is one example of 
“terms which are highly significant within the EU legal and political context, but which remain 
nonetheless or even deliberately uncertain in scope and meaning”, in “Reappraising Subsidiarity’s 
Significance After Amsterdam”, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper Series, WP 7/99, at 9. 
67 Some add a third part to this formulation: “in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty”, see 
A.A.M. Schrauwen, id. at 144-145. However, even if regarded as a separate part of the definition, this 
sentence is of considerably less importance, as accepted by Schrauwen herself. 
68 See Pescatore, who comments “what does Article 8A mean when it speaks of ‘an area without 
internal frontiers’? What are frontiers in this context?” in “Some critical remarks on the ‘Single 
European Act” (1987) Common Market Law Review 24, 9-18, at 16. 
69 See C.D. Ehlermann, “The Internal Market following the Single European Act” (1987) Common 
Market Law Review 24, 361– 409, at 364. 
70 However, the formula suggested by the Commission was slightly different: it referred to “an area 
without internal frontiers … under conditions identical to those obtaining within a Member State”, see 
C.D. Ehlermann, id at Annex III and 408. The final sentence was ultimately omitted and substituted by 
“in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty”. 
71 See C.D. Ehlermann, n. 69 above, at 366. 
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movement. If this was in fact the Commission’s intention, the tactic might have worked 
slightly too well: the expression is potentially so broad that some commentators, and the 
Court alike, have tended to concentrate on the other aspect of the definition of internal 
market: the so-called four freedoms.72 The most significant exception to this tendency has 
been the Court’s ruling in Rundfunk and Others were it stated that the recourse to Article 95 
of the EC Treaty as a legal basis for Community legislation did not presuppose the existence 
of an actual link with free movement.73 Implicitly, therefore, the Court is acknowledging that 
there is more to the “establishment and the functioning of the internal market” than just free 
movement. 
This approach, however, is not universally accepted amongst commentators, with some 
arguing to the contrary: that free movement is a broader concept than “an area without 
internal frontiers” and that even where internal borders have been abolished, free movement 
might still not have been attained.74 For these authors, the attainment of an area without 
internal frontiers can be judged by whether any border controls still exist on the free 
movement. Notwithstanding the controversy, however, and even if one accepts the narrower 
approach to the interpretation of the expression “an area without internal frontiers”, i.e. that it 
entails only the abolition of border controls, it seems clear than in some areas, such as VAT, 
this aim has not (yet) been attained. In fact, insofar as VAT is concerned there are still border 
controls albeit taking a different format from those applicable before 1993. 
The separate reference to the four freedoms in Article 14 has also been the target of 
criticisms.75 Once again, as with the expression “an area without internal frontiers”, the main 
difficulty seems to be the lack of precision, i.e. when can it be said that goods, persons, 
services, and capital move freely within the Community? There are two possible answers to 
this question, which reflect two different criteria, as follows: a narrower (and perhaps easier) 
criterion, according to which free movement will be attained once the White Paper 
programme has been accomplished; and a wider criterion, according to which in order for free 
                                                 
72 See A.A.M. Schrauwen, who comments “les horizons de l’espace sans frontiers etant larges, ses 
limites devront venir des autres carateristiques essentielles”, n. 66 above, at 142. 
73 Joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01, and C-139/01, [2003] ECR I-12971. For an analysis of this case in 
the concept of the Community’s internal market competence, see D. Wyatt, “Community Competence 
to Regulate the Internal Market”, University of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 9/2007, July 2007, at 36– 40. 
74 See P. Craig and G. de Búrca, n. 31 above, at 1180. 
75 P. Verloren van Themaat, former Advocate General at the ECJ, comments that the separate reference 
to the free movement, without mention of fair competition and unity of market, constitutes an “artificial 
separation”, which cannot but create “practical, political, and legal problems”, in “The Contributions to 
the Establishment of the Internal Market by the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities”, in R. Bieber et al (eds.), 1992: One European Market? A Critical Analysis of the 
Commission’s Internal Market Strategy (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988), at 115. P. 
Pescatore also points out that in his opinion the reference to free movement is merely informative and 
does not merit the qualification as legal definition, see A.A.M. Schrauwen, n. (…) above, at 142-143. 
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movement to be attained several other measures have to be put in place in addition to those 
contained in the White Paper.76  Indeed, there is an undeniable link between the White Paper 
programme and achieving free movement, to the extent that it has been said that “the 1992 
programme and the SEA are inseparable from one another”.77 Such connection is confirmed 
by Declaration 3 annexed to the SEA, entitled “Declaration on Article 8a EEC Treaty”, which 
states: 
“The conference wishes by means of the provisions in Article 8a to express its firm 
political will to take before 1 January 1993 the decisions necessary to complete the 
internal market in those provisions, and more particularly the decisions necessary to 
implement the Commission’s programme described in the White Paper on the Internal 
Market”.78 
Relying on this connection, some authors have defended that “if the White Paper’s strategies 
are applied correctly and with dexterity, there is a real chance of achieving the free movement 
of goods, persons, services, and capital”.79 Others, however, have argued that the White Paper 
programme is “the tip of an iceberg” and several others measures would need to be taken 
before free movement was achieved.80 The continued reference to the “internal market 
policy” post-1992 in Community official documentation does indeed seem to confirm this 
wider approach. However – and in parallel with what has been said as regards “an area 
without internal frontiers” – even if the narrower approach was to be adopted, i.e. that free 
movement would be attained once the White Paper programme was fully implemented, then 
the conclusion would still have to be that, insofar as VAT is concerned, free movement has 
not been attained. In fact, as set out below, the measures set out in the White Paper in respect 
of VAT have yet to be implemented. Moreover, if the wider, more dynamic – and most 
probably correct – approach to the meaning of free movement is adopted, it is clear that 
current VAT law does not fulfil the criterion, as also demonstrated below through the analysis 
of the practical problems caused by this system. 
                                                 
76 There is of course a third possible answer, which reflects an even narrower criterion, that is that free 
movement can be achieved without the implementation of the measures set out in the White Paper. 
This, however, does not seem to be a credible criterion in light of the history of SEA, the IGC 
negotiations and the link between the SEA and the White Paper. 
77 See D. Allen, “European union, the Single European Act and the 1992 programme”, in D. Swann 
(ed.), The single European market and beyond – A study of the wider implications of the Single 
European Act (London: Routledge, London, 1992), at 50. 
78 OJ L169, 26/06/1987, 24. 
79 See S.H. von Sydow, “The Basic Strategies of the Commission’s White Paper”, in R. Bieber et al. 
(eds.), 1992: One European Market? A Critical Analysis of the Commission’s Internal Market Strategy 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988), 79-106, at 106. 
80 See P. Craig, “The Evolution of the Single Market”, in C. Barnard and J. Scott (eds.), The Law of the 
Single European Market – Unpacking the Premises (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
2002), at 15. 
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The ECJ case law as regards the Community’s legislative competence in respect of the 
internal market provides further guidance as regards its concept. In Titanium Dioxide the 
Court stated that “in order to give effect to the fundamental freedoms in [Article 14], 
harmonising measures are necessary to deal with disparities between the laws of the Member 
States in areas where such disparities are liable to create or maintain distorted conditions of 
competition”.81 The Court’s ruling in Titanium Dioxide, and in particular the adoption of such 
a wide interpretation of the concept of internal market, gave rise to intense controversy at the 
time of its release.82  It was said at the time that it endangered the rule of law,83 and that it 
constituted a clear sign of the decline of the principal of conferral of powers.84 The Court’s 
ruling in Waste Directive two years later appears to narrow down the scope of the internal 
market competence.85 However, it was not until a few years later, in Tobacco Advertising, 
that the Court seemed to put these fears definitively to rest by attempting to establish the 
boundaries of the internal market concept.86 
The case concerned the use of Article 95 of the EC Treaty as a legal basis for a directive on 
advertising of tobacco products. The Court ruled that measures referred to in Article 95 must 
be intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market, and that the article did not vest in the Community the general power to regulate the 
internal market.87 Implicit in the judgment, therefore, is the distinction between measures 
intended to improve conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market, 
on one hand; and measures intended to regulate the internal market, on the other hand. The 
Community’s competence under Article 95 is limited to the first aspect.88 Moreover, 
according to the Court “the mere finding of disparities between national rules and of abstract 
risk of obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortion of competition” was 
                                                 
81 Case C-300/89, Commission v Council, [1991] ECR I-2867, at paragraph 15. 
82 Although the reference to elimination of distortions to competition as part of the concept of internal 
market was not original, see J. Usher, “Case C-376/98, Germany v European Parliament and Council 
(tobacco advertising). Judgment of the Full Court of 5 October 2000, [2000] ECR I-8419” (2001) 
Common Market Law Review 38, 1519-1543, at 1527 et seq. 
83 See S. Crosby, “The Single Market and the Rule of Law” (1991) European Law Review 16, 451– 
465. 
84 See R. Barents, “The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations on the Legal Basis of 
Community Legislation” (1993) Common Market Law Review 30, 85–109; although the author’s 
comments seem to come as praise, rather than criticisms, for the Court’s ruling. 
85 The Court ruled in this case that “the mere fact that the establishment or functioning of the internal 
market is affected is not sufficient for Article 100a of the Treaty to apply. It appears from the Court’s 
case law that recourse to Article 100a is not justified where the measure to be adopted has only the 
incidental effect of harmonising market conditions within the Community”, see C-155/91, [1993] ECR 
I-2869, at paragraph 19. 
86 Case C-376/98, [2000] ECR I-8419. 
87 Id at paragraphs 83 of the judgment. 
88 The same rationale should apply mutatis mutandis to Article 93, as well as to all other Treaty 
provisions, which refers to adoption of measures with a view to “the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market”. 
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not sufficient to justify the choice of Article 95 as a legal basis.89 On the specific aspect of 
distortion of competition, the Court limited the interpretation adopted in Titanium Dioxide by 
ruling that only where the distortion is “appreciable” can a measure be adopted on the basis of 
Article 95 as “in the absence of such a requirement, the powers of the Community legislature 
would be practically unlimited”.90 Advocate General Fennelly had further suggested in his 
Opinion that in order to determine whether a Community measure pursues internal market 
objectives, a two-part test has to be fulfilled: first, it must be ascertained whether the 
“preconditions for harmonisation exist”, i.e. disparate national rules which either constitute 
barriers to the exercise of the four freedoms or distort conditions of competition in an 
economic sector; and second, the action taken by the Community must either intend to 
eliminate those barriers or intend to eliminate the distortions of competition.91 Although not 
explicitly referring to it, the Court essentially follows this test, with some important 
qualifications, namely to the first requirement: the existing obstacles to the four freedoms 
must be concrete and existing distortions of competition must be both concrete and 
appreciable.92 
The Court ultimately annulled the Directive on the grounds of lack of competence,93 thus 
giving rise to the claim that the decision constituted one of the most important ever delivered 
by the Court on Community legislative competence, and one which reversed a long trend 
towards the expansive interpretation of the legislative competence of the Community.94 Such 
enthusiastic claims seem to have somewhat overestimated the impact of the ruling.95 Key 
questions remain such as, what is the scope of harmonisation envisaged by the EC Treaty, or 
                                                 
89 Case C-376/98, [2000] ECR I-8419, paragraph 84 of the judgment. D. Wyatt argues that in order for 
the measure to fall within the scope of Article 95 obstacles must be “actual or potential, direct or 
indirect (but not, it seems, if the effect is too remote and indirect to hinder trade)”, in “Constitutional 
Significance of the Tobacco Advertising Judgment of the European Court of Justice”, CELS 
Occasional Paper 5, July 2001, 19–31, at 23. 
90 Case C-376/98, [2000] ECR I-8419, paragraphs 106 and 107 of the judgment; see also paragraphs 89 
and 90 of the Advocate General’s Opinion. 
91 Id at paragraph 93 of Advocate General’s Opinion. 
92 The use of the expression “distortion of competition” in this ruling has been the target of criticism, 
namely that it does not “adequately capture the normative concern that the Court of Justice is plausibly 
trying to address”, see M. Kumm, “Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of 
Tobacco Regulation in the European Union” (2006) European Law Journal 12(4), 503–533, at 505 and 
508-515. 
93 As S. Douglas-Scott comments, the first case in which the Court did so, “thus presenting itself as the 
first full application of the principle of limited powers by the Court”, in Constitutional Law of the 
European Union, First Edition (Essex: Longman, 2002), at 168. See also G. de Búrca, “The Tobacco 
Advertising Saga: Political Aspirations and Constitutional Constrains”, CELS Occasional Paper 5, July 
2001, 5–18, at 7; and C. Hillon, “Tobacco Advertising: If you must, you may” (2001) Cambridge Law 
Journal 60(3), 486-489, at 488-489. 
94 See G. Tridimas and T. Tridimas, “The European Court of Justice and the Annulment of the Tobacco 
Advertising Directive: Friend of National Sovereignty or Foe of Public Health?” (2002) European 
Journal of Law and Economics 14(2), 171-183, at 179; and P. Craig, n. (…) above, at 32-33. 
95 See in particular cases C-491/01, Tobacco Labelling, [2002] ECR I-11453; C-210/03, Swedish 
Match, [2004] ECR I-11893; and C-380/03, Tobacco Advertising II, [2006] ECR I-11573. 
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how much harmonisation is constitutionally permitted, and constitutionally required?96 As 
defended below, answers to these questions are not absolute, applicable to all subareas of the 
internal market policy, but rather casuistic, dependent on the specific field in question. 
4.2 Why the current VAT law is incompatible with the internal market 
It has been defended that the institutional choices regarding the allocation of regulatory 
powers within the Community may be represented in three ideal constitutional models of the 
European Economic Constitution: a centralised constitutional model; a competitive 
constitutional model; and a decentralised constitutional model. The centralised model favours 
a process of market regulation by the replacement of national laws with Community 
legislation. The basic principle behind this model is that Member States’ domestic legislation 
is incompatible with the aim of an integrated market, and should therefore, be replaced by 
harmonised Community legislation. The competitive model promotes competition between 
legal orders, namely through the principle of mutual recognition. The basic idea here is that 
market forces will work to create an integrated and more efficient market. In the decentralised 
model, Member States will retain regulatory powers, but are prevented from developing 
protectionist policies.97 
In practice, however, these constitutional models are not applied separately within the 
Community. Instead, there is an interaction between the three in different Community policy 
areas: within the internal market policy it is clear that, although the presence of the 
decentralised model is less apparent,98 there is a continuous interplay between the centralised 
and the competitive models. As regards VAT policy, the reference in Article 93 of the EC 
Treaty to “harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes” clearly indicates that the 
legislator has favoured a centralised approach. Moreover, the use of the word “shall” in the 
beginning of the provision indicates that not only is the Treaty conferring competence on the 
Community to harmonise VAT laws, but that there is an obligation on the European 
institutions to do so. Notwithstanding this, the establishment of limits to this harmonising 
competence in Article 93 – the fact the Community only has competence to harmonise “to the 
extent that such harmonisation is necessary to ensure the establishment and the functioning of 
the internal market” – signals that there is still room for competition between legal orders 
                                                 
96 See S. Weatherill, “Supply of and demand for internal market regulation: strategies, preferences and 
interpretation”, in N. Nic Shuibhne (ed.), Regulating the Internal Market (Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2006), 29-56, at 29-38. 
97 See M. Poiares Maduro, We, the Court – The European Court of Justice & the European Economic 
Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), at 108–149. Although the author is referring primarily to 
market regulation under Article 30 of the EC Treaty, the distinction between these alternative models is 
useful for other areas of what he refers to as the “European Economic Constitution”. 
98 This is mainly because under the decentralised model Member States retain their regulatory powers, 
whilst it is clear that as regards the internal market policy the Community has competence. 
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within the area of VAT. Competition between legal orders will therefore be allowed in areas 
which do not interfere with “the establishment and functioning of the internal market”.99  For 
this reason, it seems that the legislator has adopted within the VAT policy what can be 
designated as a “mitigated centralised model”: one that is based on a centralised approach, but 
under which a limited level of competition between legal orders is not only allowed, but 
mandatory. 
Yet, as will be demonstrated in the following sections, “a mitigated centralised model” is not 
in place within the VAT area: there are many aspects of the tax which constitute serious 
obstacles to either the establishment, or the functioning of the internal market and where 
competition between legal orders is still a reality. Moreover, even where harmonisation has 
taken place, Member States have been allowed a broad scope of flexibility and differentiation 
at both macro and micro level. In fact, macro-flexibility can be witnessed through the 
inclusion within the VAT Directive of general exceptions, options, and in some areas of the 
system, a high degree of discretion as regards the implementation of provisions;100 whilst 
micro-flexibility is evidenced by the numerous authorisations granted to Member States to 
derogate from the VAT Directive provisions. As it will be demonstrated below, the lack of 
harmonisation in areas which impact on the establishment or functioning of the internal 
market, together with these different levels of differentiation, have had disastrous 
consequences for the Community’s VAT system.101 
The arguments presented to substantiate the above statement have a tripartite nature – 
historical, practical, and jurisprudential analyses indicate that current European VAT law does 
not meet conditions of an internal market. Historical analysis demonstrates that the current 
law has failed to reach the minimum level of harmonisation traditionally regarded as a 
prerequisite for the establishment of the internal market. From a practical perspective, 
existing law gives rise to serious difficulties, which qualify as obstacles not merely to the 
functioning of the internal market, but to its very establishment. Finally, analysis of ECJ VAT 
jurisprudence demonstrates that these obstacles cannot be overcome through incremental 
interpretative developments emerging from the Court as regards secondary VAT law. 
                                                 
99 As former Advocate-General W. van Gerven has recently been pointed out, uniformity of law is not 
an objective in itself, consequently harmonisation should only take place where there is a good 
justification – such justification consists primarily in the necessity to operate an internal market within 
a reasonable level playing field, see “Two Twin-Principles of EU Law: Democracy and Accountability, 
Consistency and Convergence” in U. Bernitz, J. Nergelius and C. Cardiner (eds.) General Principles of 
EC Law in a Process of Development (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2008), at 44. 
100 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, 
OJ L347, 11/12/2006, 1–118. Hereafter the VAT Directive 
101 For an analysis of the potential negative effects of micro flexibility and differentiation within the 
internal market policy in general, see G. de Búrca, “Differentiation within the Core: The Case of the 
Common Market”, in G. de Búrca and J. Scott (eds.), Constitutional Change in the EU – From 
Uniformity to Flexibility? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 133–171, at 142 et seq. 
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4.2.1 Historical arguments 
Despite the European Commission’s commitment and the real and significant progress 
achieved since the introduction of the transitional VAT system – in particular in the last few 
years in the context of the 2000 VAT strategy – it is clear that the level of VAT 
harmonisation, which the White Paper regarded as fundamental for the establishment of the 
internal market, has not yet been achieved. 
The 1987 proposals envisaged three major changes to the Community VAT system then in 
force, as follows:102 abolition for intra-Community trade of the system of exempting (or zero 
rating) of tax exports and imposing tax on imports; introduction of a VAT clearing 
mechanism, to ensure fair allocation of revenues; and, approximation of VAT rates.103 These 
three changes were interlinked and to a certain extent interdependent. The principal argument 
advanced by the Commission to support this package was of an instrumental nature: it argued 
that the approval of its proposals was fundamental for “completing the internal market”,104 i.e. 
harmonisation was advocated as an instrument through which a desired objective (the 
establishment of an internal market) would be achieved, rather than as an end in itself.105 The 
instrumental nature of these VAT proposals in relation to the establishment of the internal 
market is of crucial importance: if the approval of these proposals was regarded by the 
Commission as fundamental to the establishment of the internal market, and as these 
proposals were never approved, there is a significant basis to argue that the internal market, as 
regards VAT, was never established. 
                                                 
102 Not all of these proposals related to VAT, many focusing instead on excise duties: see Proposal for 
a Council Directive completing the common system of value added tax and amending Directive 
77/388/EEC – Approximation of VAT rates, COM(87) 321 final, 21 August 1987; Proposal for a 
Council Directive completing and amending Directive 77/388/EEC – Removal of fiscal frontiers, 
COM(87) 322 final, 21 August 1987; Completing the internal market – the introduction of a VAT 
clearing mechanism for intra-Community sales, Working document from the Commission, COM(87) 
323, 5 August 1987; Proposal for a Council directive instituting a process of convergence of rates of 
value added tax and excise duties, COM(87) 324 final, 21 August 1987; and four proposals on the 
approximation of cigarette taxes, of manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes, of excise duties on 
mineral oils and of excise duties on alcoholic beverages and other products containing alcohol, 
COM(87) 325 to 328, 21 August 1987. 
103 B.J. Terra and J. Kajus identify four changes, making a distinction between the proposed 
administrative treatment of intra-Community supplies of goods and the new substantive treatment 
proposed for intra-Community supplies of services, see A guide to the Sixth VAT Directive – 
Commentary to the Value Added Tax of the European Union, Loose-leaf (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 1993–2001), at 65 et seq. 
104 It is also indicative that several of the Commission’s 1987 proposals and working documents used 
this expression in the title. 
105 The instrumental nature of the arguments advanced by the Commission is defended by C. Lee, M. 
Pearson and S. Smith. However, these authors consider the ultimate objective to be the abolition of 
fiscal frontier controls, see Fiscal Harmonisation: An analysis of the European Commission’s 
proposals, (London: The Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1988), at 10. This assessment is, if not incorrect, 
at least limited: the abolition of fiscal frontiers was in itself regarded, since first proposed in the White 
Paper, as an instrument to achieve the ultimate objective of establishing the internal market. 
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As it happens, the VAT 1987 proposals were not approved, and the level of harmonisation 
envisaged by those proposals has never been attained. Instead a transitional VAT system was 
approved.106 The main change under the new system was the abolition of fiscal controls at 
internal frontiers from 1 January 1993 – the taxable event, i.e. the intra-Community 
acquisition must therefore be reported on the internal VAT return rather than to customs 
officials at the borders.107 New administrative obligations were also established: the abolition 
of the physical control and the control of documents to be presented upon importation, 
required the establishment of a VAT Information Exchange System (the “VIES”) in order to 
combat potential fraud,108 as well as new system of collecting statistics on the trading of 
goods between Member States of the European Union, known as the Intrastat.109 A new rate 
structure was approved, but it differed massively from the one proposed by the Commission 
in 1987.110 Largely a product of political compromises, and an example of the victory of 
politics over economical efficiency, the new structure was extremely complex and comprised 
two types of rules: general rules; and temporary measures, which would apply only during the 
transitional system.111 
The VAT transitional system was supposed to be in place for a period of four years following 
the elimination of fiscal frontiers on 1 January 1993. A time plan was, therefore, agreed upon 
according to which the Commission would bring proposals forward by the end of 1994, with 
a view to implementing a definitive VAT system by 1997. Unfortunately, the Commission 
was unable to fulfil this time plan and it was not until the summer of 1996 that a work 
programme was presented for the adoption of the definitive VAT system. In order to achieve 
the proposed definitive VAT system, the 1996 programme set out a provisional timetable, 
which extended to mid-1999.112 Sadly the 1996 approach proved as difficult to implement as 
the 1987 one. In 2000 the Commission presented a VAT strategy based on a very different 
approach – a “viable strategy” to overcome the shortcomings of the transitional VAT system. 
This strategy is based on four main objectives: simplification of current EU VAT rules; 
modernisation of those same rules; more uniform application of current rules; and stronger 
administrative cooperation. In order to achieve these objectives, the Commission’s 
                                                 
106 For an analysis of the arrangements under the new transitional system, see C. Celorico Palma, “O 
IVA e o mercado interno – reflexões sobre o regime transitório” (1998) Cadernos de Ciência e Técnica 
Fiscal 178, 193–225. 
107 Council Directive 91/680/EEC of 16 December 1991 (OJ L376, 31/12/1991, 1), known as the 
“Abolition of Fiscal Frontiers Directive”. 
108 The VIES was introduced by the Administrative Cooperation Regulation, see Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 218/92/EEC of 27 January 1992, OJ L24, 01/02/1992, 1. 
109 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3330/91 of 7 November 1991, OJ L316, 16/11/1991, 1. 
110 Council Directive 92/77/EEC of 19 October 1992, OJ L316, 31/10/1992, 1. 
111 The temporary nature of these measures is, however, questionable, in view of the fact that more than 
ten years after their approval, they remain in force. 
112 See COM(96) 328 final, 22 July 1996, n. 28 above. 
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communication set up a detailed action plan.113 This new approach has proved moderately 
successfully, and has led over the last decade to the approval of various legislative 
instruments, which have amended the European VAT system.114 However, the abandonment 
of a more ambitious approach, as set out in the White Paper, has come at a heavy cost. 
4.2.2 Practical arguments 
The European VAT system currently in place is complex, inefficient, and susceptible to fraud. 
Measures have been taken in some areas to ameliorate the functioning of the system (like the 
new legislation on administrative cooperation, or the new VAT package legislation) including 
areas where the competing interests involved are difficult to reconcile (new Intrastat 
Regulation). However, the bulk of the VAT system remains a serious concern. As the 
Commission has acknowledged: 
“It is accepted that the current transitional arrangements have a number of shortcomings, 
because they are complicated, susceptible to fraud (the problem of the so called “carousel 
fraud” is becoming of increasing concern) and are out of date.”115 
As it currently stands, the system causes difficulties to national administrations and traders 
alike. It prevents Member States from fulfilling their full revenue potential, and consequently 
– due to the Community’s own resources system – the Community’s full revenue potential.116 
                                                 
113 See COM(2000) 348 final, 7 June 2000 and COM(2003) 614 final, 10 October 2003, n. (…) above. 
114 See in particular new Intrastat rules, Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1982/2004 of 18 November 
2004, OJ L343, 19/11/2004, 3; new conferment of implementing powers and the procedure of adoption 
derogations, Council Directive 2004/7/EC of 20 January 2004, OJ L27, 30/01/2004, 44; publication of 
VAT Committee decisions, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1777/2005 of 17 October 2005, OJ L288, 
29/10/2005, 1; rationalisation of derogations, Council Directive 2006/69/EC of 24 July 2006, OJ L221, 
12/08/2006, 9; the already mentioned Recast of the Sixth Directive, n. 100 above. See more 
importantly perhaps the new VAT package: Council Directive 2008/8/EC of 12 February 2008, OJ 
L44, 20/02/2008, 11–22, as regards place of supply of services; Council Directive 2008/9/Ec of 12 
February 2008, OJ L44, 20/02/2008, 23-28, as regards a new refund arrangements for taxable persons 
not established in the Member State of refund, but established in another Member State which will 
substitute the former arrangements, under the soon to be repealed Eighth Directive; and Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 143/2008 of 12 February 2008, OJ L44, 20/02/2008, 1-6, and a new 
administrative cooperation rules aimed at enhancing information exchange on place of supply of 
services and the new refund procedure. 
115 In COM(2000) 348 final, 7 June 2000, n. 29 above, at paragraph 10. 
116 Currently, the main legislative instrument in this area is Council Decision 2007/436/EC, Euratom of 
7 June 2007, OJ L163, 23/06/2007, 17-21. However, it is important to note that the system is not as 
simple as these basic principles may suggest. In fact, the rules regarding Member States’ calculation of 
their VAT own resources base are quite complex. The general rules can be found in Regulation (EEC, 
EURATOM) No. 1553/89 of 29 May 1989 regarding the definitive uniform arrangements for the 
collection of own resources accruing from VAT, OJ L155, 07/06/1989, 9, as last amended by Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 807/2003 of 14 April 2003, OJ L122, 16/05/2003, 36-62. However, in order to 
simplify calculations, several Member States have requested authorisations to derogate from these 
general rules, see R. de la Feria, A Handbook of EU VAT Legislation, Volumes 1, 2 and 3, Loose-leaf 
(The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law International, 2004 onwards) for a compilation of all 
VAT legislation to date. 
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It increases administration and compliance costs,117 diminishing economic efficiency.118 In 
some cases it distorts competition within the Community, and represents an obstacle to intra-
community trade. Ultimately, as it stands VAT law constitutes an obstacle to the 
establishment and the functioning of the internal market as defined by the EC Treaty. 
Although it is impossible to analyse all the areas of the current VAT law which give rise to 
difficulties, four problematic areas can be chosen for analysis as a sample of the overall 
system: inter-jurisdictional issues, convergence of VAT rates, deductibility of input VAT, and 
VAT treatment of public sector bodies. The criterion used for their selection is a general 
assessment (admittedly subjective) of their importance as a basis of the whole system or for 
the functioning of that same system. They can then divided between areas which constitute an 
obstacle to intra-community trade, and free movement of goods and services – inter-
jurisdictional arrangements and VAT rates – and areas which constitute an obstacle to 
achieving the market’s full potential, either directly – deductibility of input tax – or indirectly 
– VAT treatment of public sector bodies. The division between obstacles to intra-community 
trade and obstacles to achieving the market’s full potential is purely conceptual, but 
fundamental. It is the difference between establishing an internal market as regards VAT, and 
having an internal market which in terms of VAT has achieved its full potential. The criterion 
for the distinction is interlinked with the analysis of the concept of internal market undertaken 
above – it is aimed at reflecting the intensity of distortions caused to the internal market. As 
regards the distinction between direct and indirect obstacles to achieving the market’s full 
potential, the criterion used has been the way in which these obstacles impact on the 
Community market – direct obstacles are those areas of VAT which create obstacles to 
traders engaging or wishing to engage in intra-Community trade; indirect obstacles are those 
areas of VAT law which do not relate directly to intra-Community trade, and are rather seen 
as internal VAT areas, but which indirectly have a negative impact on the overall efficient 
functioning of the system. 
4.2.2.1 Inter-jurisdictional issues 
                                                 
117 Preliminary estimates presented by the Commission in 1996 indicated that, on average, the costs for 
companies of administering transactions carried out in other Member States is five or six times more 
than costs would be for similar transactions in their home countries. As the Commission accepted, 
these costs are likely to constitute an insurmountable barrier to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
wanting to penetrate the Internal Market, see COM(96) 328 final, 22 July 1996, n. 28 above, at 3-4. 
118 The OECD has recently carried out a cross country comparison on VAT efficiency levels, defined 
as the share of VAT revenues to consumption divided by the standard rate. Although, the study does 
not assess the efficiency of the EU VAT system as a whole, it ranks the efficiency of Member States’ 
individual VAT systems, thus indirectly providing an insight into the functioning of that system. The 
results are disheartening: Member States’ VAT systems tend to rank below the OECD efficiency 
average, which stands at 52.9, with maximum efficiency represented by 100 points, see D. Snell, “GST 
– Revenue and Business Risk”, in R. Krever and D. White (Eds.), GST in Retrospect and Prospect 
(Wellington: Thomson Brookers, 2007), 423-430, at 426. 
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Inter-jurisdictional issues include place of supply rules as well as all the ancillary rules setting 
out administrative obligations, such as VIES, Intrastat and foreign VAT refund procedures. 
As they currently stand, these rules create significant compliance and administrative costs 
with direct and indirect negative consequences, as follows:119 administrative costs act as an 
incentive to tax administrations to obstruct, or refuse altogether, refund claims – this 
significantly undermines the principle of the right to deduct VAT, a core principle of the EU 
VAT system; compliance costs are a deterrent for companies to use the procedure, 
undermining the principle of the right to deduct VAT; administrative costs are an impediment 
for Member States to achieve VAT’s full revenue potential; compliance costs can also subvert 
the use of other VAT rules, namely the place of supply rules, undermining the function of the 
whole VAT system; and, finally, compliance costs can also act as an obstacle to intra-
Community trade – mostly to SMEs – which would rather not engage in intra-Community 
trade in order to avoid the use of the procedure. 
4.2.2.2 VAT rates 
The current rate structure, and more specifically the lack of convergence of these rates, causes 
significant economic distortions from the perspective of businesses. Increased compliance 
costs: the difficulty establishing the VAT rate applicable to a determined supply in another 
Member State, amplifies companies’ compliance costs, thus decreasing economic efficiency. 
Engaging in the most basic business transaction in another Member State entails extensive 
study of the rates applicable in that State, and in many situations, the resort to external tax 
expert advice,120 creating a significant additional financial burden. 
Infringement of the principle of VAT’s neutrality and distorted competition: the wide disparity 
of VAT rates across the EU can potentially cause significant distortions of competition by 
infringing the principle of VAT’s neutrality vis-à-vis the conditions of competition. There are 
strong indications that lower and reduced rates can be a factor in corporate profitability – thus 
companies trading in a Member State applying a lower standard rate, a reduced or zero rate of 
VAT may be able to take higher profit margins, giving them an advantage over competitors in 
other Member States. This is confirmed by the Copenhagen Economics 2007 Study, which 
concludes that “conflicts between the desirability of fiscal neutrality between like products 
                                                 
119 For a detailed analysis of the difficulties caused by the current inter-jurisdictional rules, see R. de la 
Feria, “Place Where the Supply/Activity Is Effectively Carried Out as an Allocation Rule: VAT v. 
Direct Taxation” in M. Lang et al (eds.), Value Added Tax and Direct Taxation - Similarities and 
Differences (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009), 961-1014, at 970 et seq. 
120 As the European Commission has acknowledged, see Proposal for a Council Directive amending 
Directive 77/388/EEC as regards reduced rates of value added tax, COM(2003) 397 final, 23 July 
2003, at paragraph 42. 
 28
and protecting a well functioning internal market to be an issue of probably rising 
importance”.121 
Distortions of competition can also arise from a form of VAT avoidance labelled by the 
Parliament’s Directorate General for Research, as the “place of establishment option”.122 
Where transactions are taxed on the place of establishment of the business (e.g. under general 
rule for supply of services, Article 43 of the VAT Directive), differences in VAT rates (can) 
act as the decisive factor for businesses’ location decisions: where companies have places of 
establishment in several Member States, invoices would as far as possible be issued from 
those in lower-taxed Member States. Additionally, some companies, namely within the 
services industry, take the “place of establishment option” further, and on a VAT planning 
motivated shift, locate themselves in Member States which apply lower rates of VAT, such as 
Luxembourg.123 
Creates obstacle to intra-community trade: the difficulty determining the VAT rates 
applicable in other Member States, because of the high compliance costs it entails, can 
constitute a deterrent for traders, namely for small and medium size businesses, to engage in 
intra-community trade. Again, this conclusion is confirmed by the Copenhagen Economics 
2007 Study: 
“Without doubt, a bewildering set of different VAT rates across EU for the same products 
will create some barriers to the internal market as non domestic sellers will have to spend 
more time finding how about the proper VAT rate in other countries and therefore be at 
the margin more hesitant about marketing products in other countries. As for compliance 
costs, it is likely that such barriers are most important when the VAT variation is at the 
first level of aggregation, i.e., when you have to study very carefully what VAT to apply 
when you sell your goods and services to other countries.”124 
By increasing the compliance costs, the lack of convergence of VAT rates stops companies 
from fulfilling their potential in terms of competitiveness. Thus, it has a preventive impact, 
stopping the EU market from achieving the objectives set out in the Lisbon Strategy: “to 
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”.125 By 
infringing the principle of neutrality of VAT, the lack of convergence of VAT rates negates 
                                                 
121 See Copenhagen Economics, Study on reduced VAT applied to goods and services in the Member 
States of the European Union, Taxation Papers, Working Paper No. 13, 2008, at 85. 
122 See Options for a definitive VAT system, Working Paper, Economic Affairs Series, E 5, October 
1995, at 84. 
123 Luxembourg currently has the lowest VAT rates within the EU – for a more detailed analysis of the 
VAT rates applicable in the several Member States, the Commission has been publishing, on an annual 
basis, a document listing the VAT rates applied to a range of products across the EU, VAT Rates 
Applied in the Member States of the European Community, January 2008. 
124 See n. 121 above, at 99. 
125 Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000 – Presidency Conclusions, at paragraph 5. 
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one of the basic principles of the EU VAT system, as set out in the VAT Directive. By 
distorting competition within the Community, the lack of convergence of VAT rates negates 
one of the main EU economic principles, as set out in Article 3 of the EC Treaty, namely 
undistorted competition, and the concept of internal market. Finally, by creating an obstacle 
to intra-community trade, the lack of VAT rates convergence constitutes an obstacle to the 
free movement of goods and services. 
4.2.2.3 Non-deductible input tax 
As regards the lack of harmonisation of non-deductible of input tax related to some business 
expenses, it is clear that the current situation is not consistent with the requirements of an 
internal market, namely because it gives rise to serious difficulties for traders, which have a 
clearly negative impact and directly impair the functioning of such a market. In fact, the 
following consequences arise from the current legal framework. 
Inequality between traders established in different Member States: thus distortions of 
competition within the internal market – traders established in a Member State in which tax is 
fully deductible (except for the general limitations) are in a beneficial situation in comparison 
with traders established in Member States which limit or exclude the right to deduct in 
relation to expenditure on specific goods or services. Economic inefficiencies within the 
internal market by increasing compliance costs for businesses engaging in intra-community 
trade: due to the disparities between Member States’ domestic legislation, it is somewhat 
difficult for businesses engaging in intra-community trade to establish which expenditure is 
deductible in other Member States without resource to external tax experts. This is 
particularly problematic in the case of Eighth Directive refunds, as the refund is subject to the 
rules on deductible input tax applicable in the Member State of refund. Additionally, further 
inefficiencies arise within the internal market by creating economic drawbacks for industries, 
which are specifically affected by limitations to the right to deduct. As reported by the 
Commission, the fact that certain Member States limit the right to deduct in relation to 
expenditure on specific goods or services has economic drawbacks for the industries involved 
in the trade of those goods or services, e.g., the motor vehicle industry and the hotel and 
catering industry.126 
As opposed to the situation in relation to inter-jurisdictional issues and rates of VAT, the 
current rules regarding non-deductible input tax create lower intensity distortions, and thus do 
not constitute an obstacle to the establishment of the internal market. However, they do give 
rise to serious difficulties which have a negative impact in the functioning of that market. In 
                                                 
126 See Proposal for a Twelfth Council Directive on expenditure not eligible for deduction of value 
added tax, COM(82) 870 final, 25 January 1983, at 2. 
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this context, the creation of an efficiently functioning internal market demands their 
alteration. 
4.2.2.4 Public sector bodies 
Finally, insofar as the current VAT treatment of public sector bodies is concerned, it gives 
rise to serious consequences, at both legal and economic levels.127 From a legal perspective, 
the current regime gives rise to definitional and interpretative problems, creates difficulties in 
calculating the portion of deductible VAT, constitutes an incentive for engaging in aggressive 
tax planning, and has the additional problem of being conceptual incoherent with the general 
principles of European VAT law. From an economic perspective, the restrictions to the 
deduction of input tax, which are the consequence of the current regime, have also resulted in 
considerable distortions. In addition, there is no definite economic evidence that exclusion of 
the products supplied by public sector bodies from full taxation, achieves the social and 
distributional aims that are often pointed out as the main reason for their current EU 
treatment.128 These inefficiencies should be contextualised in the demands of the EMU and 
the Lisbon Strategy. In this light, it is argued that the current VAT treatment of public sector 
bodies constitutes an indirect obstacle to achieving the full potential of the internal market. 
4.2.3 Jurisprudential arguments 
In the last forty years, the ECJ has developed an extremely vast body of case law in relation to 
VAT. The positive impact of this case law in this respect is demonstrated by the fact that in 
some aspects of the VAT system, such as the definition of fixed establishment, the 
Commission has considered that it is superfluous to introduce legislation based on the fact 
that the Court’s case law already provided sufficient guidance.129 In other areas such as VAT 
rates, the Court seems to have attempted to overcome the lack of legislative developments by 
adopting a harmonising role, diminishing the existing divergences across Member States’ 
                                                 
127 Many of these difficulties are common to those faced by charities and other nongovernmental 
organisations, see J. Warburton, “Charities and Business: A VAT Conundrum” (2007) British Tax 
Review 1, 73 et seq. The relevance of those difficulties for these bodies is demonstrated by the fact that 
in its 1997 report on reduced rates the Commission admitted that some exempt bodies, like charities, 
had put forward requests advocating the application of reduced VAT rates, instead of exemptions for 
their supplies, see Report from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament in 
accordance with Article 12(4) of the Sixth Council Directive of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of 
the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform 
basis of assessment, COM(97) 559 final, 13 November 1997, at 17. Although recognising the 
advantages that such a shift would bring for exempt bodies, namely in terms of deduction of input tax, 
the Commission refused the requests arguing that the application of reduced rates to these supplies 
would be contrary to the basic goal of simplifying the VAT system and reducing compliance costs. 
128 For a detailed analysis of the legal and economic difficulties, see R. de la Feria, “The EU VAT 
Treatment of Public Sector Bodies: Slowly Moving in the Wrong Direction” (2009) Intertax 37(3), 
148-165. 
129 In Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 77/388/EEC as regards the place of supply 
of services, COM(2003) 822 final, 23 December 2003, at 9. 
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VAT legislations.130 However, this by its nature an unsatisfactory solution, which can only be 
temporary. In its communication on a new VAT strategy, the Commission expressed its 
intention to present legislative proposals which would reflect the Court’s decisions in key 
areas, pointing out that: 
“A number of Court judgments concerning the application of VAT to transactions by 
holding companies, sales promotion of products in the form of discount vouchers and 
activities by public bodies have highlighted the fact that some provisions of the Sixth 
Directive are ambiguous, incomplete or out of date. The Commission may consider 
making a proposal to the Council to change these provisions”.131 
Whilst the Commission’s expressed intention undoubtedly reflects the positive impact of the 
Court’s case law in these areas, it also highlights the limitations of the Court, as it is clear that 
the Commission feels that only legislative measures could resolve the difficulties which the 
Community VAT law has given rise to. In fact, the Court’s role in the resolution of the 
problems raised by the current law should be subject to two questions: first, can the Court 
efficiently resolve these problems? and second, even if it can, should it? The answer to the 
first question can be found in the methods of interpretation adopted by the Court on VAT 
cases and the analysis of the general shortcomings of jurisprudential developments vs. 
legislative measures. The second question concerns the issue of judicial activism. 
As regards the first question, it is doubtful that the ECJ current approach to VAT law is either 
an effective or an efficient approach.  The jurisprudence of the Court can – and to some extent 
has been – an instrument of harmonisation and integration within the field of VAT. However, 
this harmonisation or integration by its own nature can only be negative, i.e. the Court can 
interpret secondary VAT provisions in light of the principles of the European VAT system or 
the general principles of Community law, but it cannot introduce new provisions, or re-write 
existing ones.132 Moreover, as recently pointed out the ECJ has never declared a VAT law 
provision to be invalid, on the basis of being contrary of these principles.133 
Additionally to the issue of negative harmonisation, the impact within the VAT law of the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ faces another limitation: decisions of the Court are just that, 
decisions, and as such are based on a given set of facts. As general as the Court tries to be in 
                                                 
130 See amongst others cases C-83/99, Commission v Spain, [2001] ECR I-445; C-276/98, Commission 
v Portugal, [2001] ECR I-1699; C-481/98, Commission v France [2001] ECR I-3369; C-267/99, Adam, 
[2001] ECR I-7467; C-384/01, Commission v France, [2003] ECR I-4395; C-109/02, Commission v 
Germany, [2004] ECR I-12691; C-305/03, Commission v United Kingdom, [2006] ECR I-1213; and C-
442/05, Zweckverband, [2008] ECR I-1817. 
131 See COM(2000) 348 final, 7 June 2000, n. 29 above, Annex, point 2.3. 
132 These jurisprudential limitations are, of course, not exclusive to VAT and the problem of negative 
integration has already been highlighted by many others in relation to the Court’s jurisprudence on 
direct taxation. 
133 See J. Englisch, Chapter xx below. 
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its judgments, as opposed to legislation which is naturally general and abstract, Court 
decisions are by their own nature concrete and specific. Consequently, extrapolating general 
principles from the Court’s decisions and applying those to distinct factual scenarios is a 
dangerous task. Not solely because given a distinct set of facts the Court might have decided 
differently, but equally because applying those principles to other circumstances might 
actually raise serious difficulties. In this context, problems of complexity and factual minutiae 
proliferate. As demonstrated by the current process regarding the new principle of prohibition 
of abuse of law, the introduction of a principle in a given judgment will demand extra 
qualifications and explanations by the Court in future judgments.134 The tendency whenever 
the Court issues a decision based on a given set of circumstances, namely on controversial 
areas such as exemptions and the right to deduct, is to request the Court to determine whether 
the same conclusion would apply if the circumstances were only slightly different. Whilst this 
practice has undoubtedly allowed the Court to develop certain areas of the EU VAT system, it 
also has created a complex set of case law, where minimal factual details govern.135 In this 
context, the level of legal uncertainty grows and situations of potential abuse, where traders 
advised by VAT experts artificially “play” with the Court’s judgments as a form of tax 
planning, may flourish. 
The above highlights the limitations faced by the Court in attempting to resolve the failings of 
Community VAT law. However, even assuming that the Court could overcome these 
limitations and resolve (at least some) of those failings, the question which should be asked 
then is whether it is appropriate for it to do so. Since the mid-1980s, the Court of Justice has 
often been the target of criticisms by academic commentators who accused it of assuming 
powers which go beyond its judicial function and of adopting a quasi-legislative role.136 The 
controversy surrounding the Court’s so-called judicial activism has mostly focussed on the 
Court’s interpretation of the Treaties and the Court’s approach to constitutional issues,137 such 
as the introduction of the principle of direct effect, giving rise to consequent passionate 
                                                 
134 See R. de la Feria, “Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law – The Creation of a New General 
Principle of EC Law Through Tax” (2008) Common Market Law Review 45(2), 395-441, at 418 et seq; 
and R. de la Feria, “Weald Leasing. Reference for a preliminary ruling in a UK case regarding the 
application of the abuse of law test to leasing structures. Court of Appeal” (2009) Highlights & Insights 
on European Taxation 7, 61-64. 
135 As J. Swinkels comments: “the case law of the ECJ, on one hand, provides clarifications on the 
existing provisions of the Sixth Directive but, on the other hand, also makes application of those 
provisions more difficult. Every ECJ judgment appears to give rise to new questions”, in “Combating 
VAT avoidance” (2005) International VAT Monitor 4, 235–246, at 246. 
136 One of the earliest commentators to adopt this perspective seems to have been H. Rasmussen in On 
the Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice (Martinus Nijhoff, 1986). 
137 Although, the use of term “judicial activism” is wide-spread, it has been criticised by T. Tridimas, 
“The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism” (1996) European Law Review 21, 199–210. 
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arguments from both the critics of the Court and its defenders.138 Although the question of 
judicial activism as regards the Court’s case law on VAT has not (as yet) been raised by 
academic commentators,139 it has been implicitly invoked by Member States’ governments in 
several cases such as Gaston Schul, Commission v United Kingdom, and Commission v 
Ireland.140 
4.3 ECJ approach: VAT vs. direct taxation 
The light of the arguments presented above, supporting the incompatibility of the current 
VAT law with the EC internal market, it would seem only natural for one to consider what 
would have happened had the Court adopted the same approach for VAT as it has been 
adopting for direct taxation. Clearly not only would the compatibility of national VAT 
provisions with fundamental freedoms be assessed, but also that of Community VAT 
provisions.141 Potential accusations of judicial activism could be easily dismissed, on the 
basis that the Court would be merely fulfilling its function as constitutional court. The 
analysis undertaken above suggests that many VAT provisions would not pass the so-called 
restriction test, as developed by the Court as regards the fundamental freedoms.142 Obviously, 
even if regarded as restrictions, VAT provisions could still be deemed to be justified and 
proportional. Amongst others, possible justifications which could accepted by the Court on 
this regard would be the insufficiently developed nature of EC law – as it was argued on 
                                                 
138 The arguments put forward by both parties will not be analysed here. For a critical view of the Court 
of Justice, see amongst others, and in addition to the above: H. Rasmussen, “Between Self-Restraint 
and Activism: A Judicial Policy for the European Court”, (1988) European Law Review 13, 28; P. 
O’Neill, “The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism”, Lords Selected 
Committee on the European Communities, Minutes of Evidence (Session 1994–95, 18th Report, H.L. 
Paper 88); T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, Fifth Edition, 2003), at 79-83. For a supportive view of the Court of Justice see amongst others: 
A.G. Toth, “The Authority of Judgments of the European Court of Justice: Binding Force and Legal 
Effects” (1982) Yearbook of European Law, 1-78; M. Cappelleti, “Is the European Court of Justice 
‘Running Wild’?”, (1987) European Law Review 12, 3; J. Weiler, “The Court of Justice on Trial” 
(1987) Common Market Law Review 24, 555; F. Mancini and Keeling, “Democracy and the European 
Court of Justice” (1994) Modern Law Review 57, 186; A. Arnull, “The European Court and Judicial 
Objectivity: A Reply to Professor Hartley” (1996) The Law Quarterly Review 112, 411-423; and A. 
Zalasinski, Chapter xx above. 
139 This is not to say that the Court’s overall jurisprudence on VAT has not been subject to criticisms, 
see L. Maublanc-Fernandez and J.P. Maublanc comments in “La Jurisprudence Communautaire 
relative a la TVA” (1994) Revue du Marché Commun et de l’Union Europeenne 380, 460–470. 
140 Cases 15/81, Gaston Schul, [1982] ECR 1409; 415/85, Commission v Ireland, [1988] ECR 3097; 
and 416/85, Commission v United Kingdom, [1988] ECR 3127. 
141 For an analysis of the ECJ jurisprudence as regards the application of EC Treaty provisions in the 
context of the Direct Tax Directives, see G. Kofler and M. Tenore, Chapter xx below. 
142 For a general analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence as regards the fundamental freedoms, see 
amongst others C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007); for a comprehensive analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence in this regard but 
when applied to direct tax matters, and the concept of restriction as applied to tax, see as a 
paradigmatic example F. Vanistendael (ed.), EU Freedoms and Taxation, EATLP International Tax 
Series, Volume 2 (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006). 
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earlier cases concerning Article 90 of the EC Treaty – or the need to combat tax avoidance or 
evasion.143 Unfortunately, this type of analysis has so far never been undertaken by the ECJ. 
 
5. Conclusion: The Constitutional Function of the ECJ 
Faced with lack of legislative progress the Court acquired a vital role in the development of 
the Community tax policy – a prime example of what has been designated as the “use of 
normative supranationalism to overcome the deficiencies of decisional supranationalism”.144 
It has been argued that this role can be qualified as that of both a Constitutional Court and a 
Supreme Court: Constitutional Court where it makes a direct application of the Treaty 
provisions; and Supreme Court where it guarantees the uniform interpretation of regulations 
or national legislation implementing directives.145 Jurisprudence within the field of taxation 
indicates that the Court has tended to separate these functions according to subject matter: 
acting as a Constitutional Court in areas not yet harmonised, or subject to very limited and 
partial harmonisation, such as direct taxation, whilst adopting the almost exclusive role of 
Supreme Court in areas which have been the target of relatively extensive harmonisation, 
such as VAT. This approach can possibly be explained by a conjugation of factors. Firstly the 
above referenced case law on non-application of Treaty provisions to exhaustively 
harmonised areas, and Court’s preference for not departing from previous case law.146 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the peculiar constitutional nature of the European 
legal system and namely what has been designated as the EU’s constitutional pluralism.147 
Whether these arguments are sufficient justification for the Court’s approach is however 
questionable. In particular attention should be paid to its potential negative effects, not least 
the fact that such an approach will unavoidably lead to a gap in the level of judicial review 
between harmonised and non-harmonised areas. The paradoxal nature of this outcome is even 
more evident when considered against the background of the EC internal market policy. 
Areas which have been subject to extensive harmonisation are often, by its very nature, those 
                                                 
143 See B. Terra and P. Wattel, n. 16 above, for the analysis of justifications accepted by ECJ within the 
field of direct tax. 
144 See P. Craig, n. 80 above, at 7. The sentence is used in the context of the Court’s jurisprudence 
regarding the freedom of establishment and Article 43 of the EC Treaty, but undoubtedly the same can 
be said of the Court’s jurisprudence in relation to tax in general. 
145 See F. Vanistendael, “The role of the Court of Justice as the supreme judge in tax cases” (1996) EC 
Tax Review 3, 114–122 
146 As recently stated by C. Costello, “while the ECJ has shifted legal position in light of changed 
institutional circumstances quite often, express overruling is a rarity”, in “Metock: free movement and 
“normal family life” in the union” (2009) Common Market Law Review 46(2), 587-662, at 599. 
Amongst the most high profile exceptions of this type are: case C-10/89, Hag II, [1990] ECR I-3711; 
joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck, [1993] ECR I-6097; and case C-127/08, Metock, [2008] 
ECR I-6241. 
147 See M. Poiares Maduro, n. 34 above. 
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traditionally regarded as more crucial to the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market – as is the case with VAT. It seems therefore bizarre that those areas regarded as more 
fundamental for the internal market, are precisely those being subject to lower standards of 
judicial review. 
It has been said that the efficiency of hierarchy of EC norms depends on the existence of a 
judicial instrument to ensure its respect.148 In a way, so does the effectiveness and uniform 
application of EC law, which was the Court’s primary argument for the establishment of the 
principle of supremacy of European law over national law.149 By refusing to assess the 
compatibility of Community secondary law with EC Treaty provisions and applying lower 
levels of judicial review to areas such as VAT the Court is putting into question all of the 
above. As Advocate General Poiares Maduro has recently stated: 
“The duty of the Court of Justice is to act as the constitutional court of the municipal legal 
order that is the Community.”150 
It would appear that as regards specific areas of European law – like VAT – the Court is 
unwilling to fully embrace this constitutional role. As set out above, there may indeed be 
good arguments to justify the Court’s approach. The risk, however, is that in the process it 
might be putting into question the very fundamental principles on which the Community legal 
order is based upon, and which it aims to protect. 
 
148 See R. Bieber and I. Salome, n. 32 above, at 927. 
149 See cases 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 3; 6/64, Costa, [1964] ECR 1141. 
150 Opinion of the Advocate General in joined cases C-402/05P and C-415/05, Kadi, [2008] ECR I-
6351, at paragraph 37. 
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